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NOTES AND COMMENTS
"REVERSING" THE FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT: CONGRESSIONAL
INTENTION OR JUDICIAL INVENTION?
INTRODUCTION
A truly democratic government requires as its foundation an
informed electorate.' The continuous growth and increasing com-
plexity of our government and its myriad agencies, however, have
posed many problems for citizens in acquiring information from the
governing bodies. In an effort to alleviate these difficulties, Congress
enacted the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)2 which grants the
public an enforceable right of access to public records. 3 Under the
James Madison discussed the need for a knowledgable people in a true democracy:
A popular government without popular information, or the means of acquiring it,
is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both. Knowledge will forever
govern ignorance, and a people who mean to be their own governors must arm
themselves with the power that knowledge gives.
Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), reprinted in 9 THE WRITINGs OF
JAMES MADISON 103 (Hunt ed. 1910). See also Note, The Freedom of Information Act: Shred-
ding the Paper Curtain, 47 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 694, 694-95 (1973).
2 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), as amended by Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat.
1247 (1976). The House Report accompanying the original act stressed the need for such a
law in a representative government:
A democratic society requires an informed, intelligent electorate, and the intelli-
gence of the electorate varies as the quantity and quality of the information
varies.
• .. [FOIA] provides the necessary machinery to assure the availability of
Government information necessary to an informed electorate.
H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2429 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REP., U.S. CODE CONG.]. The Senate Report acknowl-
edged the practical difficulty in obtaining such information due to the "very vastness of our
Government and its myriad of agencies." The FOIA policy of full disclosure was intended to
alleviate this problem. S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
S. REP.I.
Under the FOIA, the requester who is denied access to public records may bring an
action in federal district court to obtain release of the information. This proceeding is to be
given precedence by the court over all other docketed cases. The matter will be determined
de novo, and the withholding agency has the burden of demonstrating the lawfulness of its
action. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970 & Supp. V 1975). See S. REP., supra note 2, at 8.
The FOIA supplanted § 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238
(1946). Although this prior statute was intended to be disclosure oriented, see S. REP. No.
752, 79th Cong., Ist Sess. 12 (1945); ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE ACT 5-9 (1947), the various exceptions to the rule of disclosure gave the govern-
ment broad power to withhold information. Any information involving "any function of the
REVERSE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
FOIA, the government may refuse to divulge requested information
only if the material falls within one of the Act's nine strictly con-
strued exemptions.4 The passage of the Act and its subsequent
amendments clearly demonstrate congressional aversion to the lib-
eral use of the secrecy stamp in the executive branch of govern-
ment.
Since the FOIA's original enactment in 1966, several incidents
have prompted theretofore overly-secretive governmental agencies
to release, rather than withhold, requested information, even when
the information arguably fits within an FOIA exemption. The gov-
ernment, through numerous court defeats, has learned that the judi-
ciary does not consider a number of oft-requested documents and
reports to be covered by the exemptions.6 In addition, the agencies
United States requiring secrecy in the public interest" or "relating solely to the internal
management of an agency" was exempt from disclosure. Further, any final opinion or order
of an agency could be suppressed if a determination was made that it was "for good cause to
be held confidential." Finally, matters of official record were only to be released to "persons
properly and directly concerned" and then only if there was no "good cause found" for
confidentiality. Requesters wrongfully denied access to such information had no remedy in
court to compel its disclosure. Some rather unusual invocations of the APA exceptions were
documented in the House Report accompanying the FOTA. In 1961, for example, the Secre-
tary of the Navy used the "internal management" exception to withhold Navy telephone
directories. The "good cause for confidentiality" exception was utilized to conceal agency
mistakes or maladministration, such as the awarding of a government contract to one other
than the lowest bidder. HOUSE REP., supra note 2, at 5, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. at 2422-
23. See also S. REP., supra note 2, at 5. See generally Davis, The Information Act: A Prelimi-
nary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 761 (1967).
1 The exemptions remove such matters as Dational security information, personnel re-
cords, trade secrets, confidential commercial or financial information, interagency memo-
randa, and investigative files from the mandatory disclosure rule of the FOTA. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b)(1)-(9) (1970 & Supp. V 1975), as amended by Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1247
(1976). The Senate Report announced that information is to be disclosed under the FOIA
"unless explicitly allowed to be kept secret by one of the exemptions." S. REP., supra note 2,
at 10 (emphasis added). The courts have interpreted this as a directive to construe narrowly
the exemptions. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 478 F.2d 47, 49 (4th Cir. 1973); Soucie v.
David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See also Davis, The Information Act: A Prelimi-
nary Analysis, 34 U. Cm. L. REV. 761, 783-84 (1967).
5 The House Report noted the existence of 24 security classifications in addition to "Top
Secret," "Secret," and "Confidential" which could be used to restrict public access to govern-
ment files. HOUSE REP., supra note 2, at 6, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. at 2423. In response
to EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973), wherein it was held that the Executive's security
classification of information may not be judicially reviewed under the FOIA, Congress
amended the Act to provide for in camera inspection of the documents in question to deter-
mine the applicability of the national security exemption. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (Supp. V
1975). See H.R. REP. No. 876, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in [19741 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWs 6272-73; 120 CONG. REc. 17,017 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
6 The government has encountered particular difficulty in attempting to withhold Af-
firmative Action Program and Equal Employment Opportunity Reports. The agencies, in
attempting to avoid disclosure, had routinely asserted several exemptions, i.e., trade secret,
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have proven ill-equipped to handle the complex evidentiary require-
ments necessary to justify the withholding of information, particu-
larly in connection with the mushrooming number of corporate re-
quests for information supplied by and pertaining to the business
of other corporations.7 Finally, Congress, in the 1974 FOIA amend-
ments,' added administrative penalties for wrongful withholding of
information by agency officials and employees? The Senate and
House Reports accompanying these amendments clarified the origi-
nal congressional intent behind the exemptions and stressed that
they are "permissive, not mandatory,"'" thereby further encourag-
ing compliance with FOIA requests.
This new-found candor and willingness to produce requested
information has, in turn, given rise to a number of "reverse-FOIA"
suits" in which the suppliers of information attempt to prevent its
dissemination to the parties seeking its release under the FOIA.' 2
personnel files, other statute, and investigatory files, all to no avail. See Robertson v. Depart-
ment of Defense, 402 F. Supp. 1342 (D.D.C. 1975); Legal Aid Soc'y of Alameda County v.
Shultz, 349 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Cal. 1972). In addition, it is now clear that the government's
promise of confidentiality to the supplier of the information would not, per se, defeat dis-
closure under the FOIA. See, e.g., Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843 (4th Cir. 1973); Getman v.
NLRB, 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Save the Dolphins v. Department of Commerce, 404
F. Supp. 407 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
1 In 1975, for example, the Food and Drug Administration had received 12,300 FOIA
requests. Only eight percent came from public interest groups, while 86 percent originated
from industry. Arnold, Who's Going Fishing in Government Files?, 6 Juois DoCTOR, April
1976, at 17, 22. To establish the applicability of an exemption, an agency must furnish the
court with the material requested under the FOIA, together with a detailed index correlating
the claim exemption to the specific items sought. Note, Would Macy's Tell Gimbel's:
Government-Controlled Business Information and the Freedom of Information Act, Forwards
& Backwards, 6 Loy. CHI. L.J. 594, 606 (1975). At the hearing, the agency also must illustrate,
often by means of expert testimony, the damage likely to be suffered by the supplier in the
event that the requested data is released. Thus, the inquiry is a highly specialized one. See
P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS T 170 (2d ed. 1974).
5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. V 1975).
If a court determines that records were improperly withheld, awards attorney's fees to
the requester, and issues a written finding that agency personnel might have acted arbitrarily
in withholding requested information, the Civil Service Commission is required to conduct
an inquiry into the matter and may, in its discretion, direct appropriate disciplinary action.
5 U.S.C. § 552 (a)(4)(F) (Supp. V 1975). In addition, the names and titles of persons responsi-
ble for the withholding of information, wrongful or otherwise, must be supplied to Congress.
Id. at (d)(3).
10 S. REP. No. 93-854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974); H.R. REP. No. 876, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 3 (1973), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6269. See also H.R. REP.
No. 1419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1972).
" See Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Kissinger, 385 F. Supp. 769, 775 (D.D.C. 1974).
12 Only three appellate courts have considered the reverse-FOIA suit: the District of
Columbia, the Fourth, and the Fifth Circuits. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger,
542 F.2d 1190 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2199 (1977); Pennzoil Co. v. FPC, 534
F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1976); Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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Although these actions may be brought under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA),' 3 this route is disfavored by information sup-
pliers since the court may grant relief only when the agency's deci-
sion to release the information was "clearly arbitrary" or an "abuse
of discretion." 4 Seeking alternative avenues affording broader bases
of relief, reverse-FOIA plaintiffs have alleged the existence of an
implied right of action under either the FOIA exemptions" or a
federal penal statute which outlaws the disclosure of confidential
information. 6 Under either implied cause of action, the court is
empowered to exercise de novo review of the matter;' 7 the very exist-
ence of the implied causes of action, however, is still subject to
controversy. The purpose of this Note is to analyze the various bases
asserted for relief in reverse-FOIA suits and the attendant standards
of review. After a discussion of the availability and limitations of the
APA as the basis of a reverse-FOIA action, the theories underlying
implied causes of action will be examined. Some suggestions will
then be offered concerning the future of reverse-FOIA suits.
THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT
Reviewability of Agency Decisions
Section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act provides that
"[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or ad-
versely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning
of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.' 8 The
federal circuit courts of appeal had long been divided on the issue
of whether this statute is an independent grant of subject matter
jurisdiction to review agency action'9 and this confusion was re-
, See 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 703, 706(2)(A) (1970).
" Id. at § 706(2)(A).
" The implied causes of action are based upon two different theories. One theory holds
that the FOIA exemptions bar disclosure. See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. FPC, 534 F.2d 627 (5th
Cir. 1976); United States Steel Corp. v. Schlesinger, 8 F.E.P. Cas. 923 (E.D. Va. 1974). The
other theory rejects this view, but grants the supplier a cause of action to enjoin disclosure
based upon judicial interpretation of the congressional intent underlying the FOIA. See
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S.
Ct. 2199 (1977).
, 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1970), discussed in notes 112-147 infra.
' For a discussion of de novo review, see text accompanying notes 53 & 54 infra.
5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
A majority of the circuits had held that § 10 of the APA, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-04 (1970),
conferred subject matter jurisdiction upon the federal courts to review agency action. See,
e.g., Sanders v. Weinberger, 522 F.2d 1167 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'd sub. nom. Califano v.
Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977); Ortego v. Weinberger, 516 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1975); Pickus v.
1977]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:734
flected in reverse-FOIA actions as well. Those circuits which had
recognized the APA as a grant of jurisdiction utilized it as such in
reverse-FOIA actions. ' " This position appeared consistent with a
series of Supreme Court decisions.2 '
In 1976, however, Congress amended the federal question juris-
diction statute to eliminate the amount-in-controversy requirement
in actions against the United States or any agency or officer
thereof.2 2 Recognizing that this action largely undercut the rationale
for maintaining APA jurisdiction, the Supreme Court, in Califano
v. Sanders,23 held that the APA should not "be interpreted as an
implied grant of subject matter jurisdiction to review agency ac-
tions. 21 4 Despite this judicial action, there will be no difficulty in
finding a jurisdictional predicate for future reverse-FOIA cases. Jus-
tice Brennan, writing for the majority in Sanders, observed that
"[t]he obvious effect of [the amendment of the federal question
statute] . . . is to confer jurisdiction on federal courts to review
agency action .... ,,25 As there are no restrictions on judicial review
in the FOIA itself, federal question jurisdiction appears to be
broadly available to the reverse-FOIA plaintiff.26 Although no longer
serving as the jurisdictional predicate in these suits, the APA none-
United States Bd. of Parole, 507 F.2d 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Bradley v. Weinberger, 483 F.2d
410 (1st Cir. 1973); Brandt v. Hickel, 427 F.2d 53 (9th Cir. 1970); Brennan v. Udall, 379 F.2d
803 (10th Cir. 1967); Deering-Milliken, Inc. v. Johnston, 295 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1961). The
remaining circuits adopted a contrary position. See, e.g., Bramblett v. Desobry, 490 F.2d 405
(6th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 872 (1974); Zimmerman v. United States, 422
F.2d 326 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 911 (1970); Twin Cities Chippewa Tribal Council
v. Minnesota Chippewa Tribe, 370 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1967).
'0 APA jurisdiction was found by the District of Columbia Circuit in Charles River Park
"A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1975), was acknowledged as permissible in West-
inghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190, 1208-09 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97
S. Ct. 2199 (1977), and was assumed by the Fifth Circuit in Pennzoil Co. v. FPC, 534 F.2d
627 (5th Cir. 1976).
2' In three major decisions, Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367 (1962), Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967), and Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402 (1971), the Supreme Court seemed to accept the view that the APA confers subject matter
jurisdiction, permitting the courts to review a wide range of agency action. In Rusk, the Court
stated that it would "not hold that the broadly remedial provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act are unavailable to review administrative decisions ... in the absence of clear
and convincing evidence that Congress so intended." 369 U.S. at 379-80.
22 Pub. L. No. 94-574, 90 Stat. 2721 (1976) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970)).
23 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
" Id. at 105.
21 Id. The Court rejected the contention that the amendment to the jurisdictional statute
was intended merely to supplement the APA, and, instead, found that Congress sought to
"restructure afresh" the jurisdictional predicates. Id. at 107 & n.7 (quoting S. REP. No. 996,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1976)).
26 See Planning Research Corp. v. FPC, 555 F.2d 970, 977-78 & n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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theless continues to provide the procedures and standards of review
of agency decisions.
Standard of Review
The reviewability of administrative decisions under the APA is
broad; the standard of review, however, is particularly narrow. An
agency decision may be upset only if it was "arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.""
In utilizing this standard, courts are limited to a review of the ad-
ministrative record 2 and may reverse only when the agency's deci-
sion was not rationally based upon a careful deliberation of all rele-
vant factors. 29
An examination of several reverse-FOIA cases reveals the devel-
opment of a set of relevant factors to be considered by a court in an
APA review. Guidelines for APA-based review were first established
by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in
Charles River Park "A," Inc. v. HUD,3" the first reverse-FOIA case
to reach the appellate level. In Charles River, the Boston tax asses-
sor sought to obtain information submitted to the Federal Housing
Authority by certain multi-family housing projects in the Boston
area.3 ' The authority agreed to release the information even though
21 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970). The court in McCoy v. Weinberger, 386 F. Supp. 504
(W.D. Ky. 1974), utilized the alternative "in excess of statutory authority" test embodied in
the APA. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (1970). See 386 F. Supp. at 507-08. It has been noted that
this test is based on the premise that the FOIA exemptions mandate that information not be
disclosed. Hence, release of exempted information would be "in excess of statutory author-
ity." Comment, Reverse-Freedom of Information Act Suits: Confidential Information in
Search of Protection, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 995, 1013 (1976).
2' See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970). An administrative record must meet certain standards of
completeness before the decision based upon it will be sustained. See Pennzoil Co. v. FPC,
534 F.2d 627, 632 (5th Cir. 1976), discussed in notes 41-49 and accompanying text infra.
" See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). Chief Justice Hughes, in Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468
(1936), outlined the procedures essential to a proper agency decision:
There must be a full hearing. There must be evidence adequate to support pertinent
and necessary findings of fact. Nothing can be treated as evidence which is not
introduced as such .... Facts and circumstances which ought to be considered must
not be excluded. Facts and circumstances must not be considered which should not
legally influence the conclusion. Findings based on the evidence must embrace the
basic facts which are needed to sustain the order.
Id. at 480 (citations omitted).
519 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'g 360 F. Supp. 212 (D.D.C. 1973).
5 19 F.2d at 938-39. The Commissioner of Assessing sought to obtain verification of the
gross income of the projects for the purpose of real estate tax assessment. Id. at 939. He
requested information which the project had been required to provide pursuant to the regula-
tory authority of the FHA under 12 U.S.C. § 1715k (1970).
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it was apparently covered by an exemption, 32 and thus was not
subject to mandatory disclosure. Charles River Park, operator of the
housing projects, objected to disclosure and brought a reverse-FOIA
suit, asserting various implied rights of action.3 The district court,
without hearing evidence, found the information to be confidential
and barred its disclosure.34
The appellate panel deemed the record inadequate to support
the lowver court's finding of confidentiality and remanded the case
with instructions for reconsideration. The district court was di-
rected to hold an evidentiary hearing3" and to determine whether the
requested information was confidential within the meaning of Title
18, section 1905 of the United States Code, 37 a federal penal statute
forbidding disclosure of confidential data by government employ-
ees. If the material was found confidential under section 1905, re-
lease of it by the Housing Authority would constitute an abuse of
discretion.38 Should the penal statute be found inapplicable, the
trial court, to determine whether the agency abused its discretion
in deciding to release this information, was instructed to balance the
public interest in disclosure-here, the accurate assessment of
taxes-against the suppliers' interest in keeping the data confiden-
tial. A method to accomodate both interests was to be sought as
well.3 1
The Charles River decision evidences the District of Columbia
Circuit's recognition of the public interest as a weighty factor to be
32 The data was probably covered by the confidential information exemption. See 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1970).
The suppliers claimed implied causes of action under both the FOIA exemptions and
18 U.S.C. § 1905. The § 1905 action is discussed in notes 112-47 and accompanying text infra.
31 360 F. Supp. at 212. The district court rejected the claim of an implied action based
upon the FOIA exemptions, finding that the exemptions neither prohibit nor authorize disclo-
sure. Instead, the court upheld an implied right of action under § 1905. Id. at 213.
519 F.2d at 939.
The evidentiary hearing required by the Charles River panel was not the equivalent
of a de novo review of agency action, notwithstanding the contrary view of the Fourth Circuit
expressed in Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190, 1215 (4th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2199 (1977). The Charles River court explained that "[in holding
this hearing the district court is not reviewing agency action; it is making a threshold determi-
nation whether the plaintiff has any cause of action at all." 519 F.2d at 940-41 n.4 (emphasis
added).
31 Included in the § 1905 definition of "confidentiality" are trade secrets, styles of work,
secret processes, statistical data, income sources and amounts, and expenditures of any
person, partnership, corporation or association. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1970).
" 519 F.2d at 943.
"' Id. The court suggested that such an accomodation could be reached by releasing to
the tax assessor only those items necessary to his inquiry, with the express condition that he
keep them confidential. Id.
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considered in APA review of an agency's decision to release FOIA-
exempted information. Such a recognition is consistent with the
expressed congressional intent behind the FOIA that "agencies have
a definite obligation to release information-even where withhold-
ing may be authorized by the language of the statute-where the
public interest lies in disclosure."40
In the year following the Charles River decision, the guidelines
for APA review were further refined by the Fifth Circuit in Pennzoil
Co. v. FPC ' In Pennzoil, the Federal Power Commission (FPC) had
been provided, pursuant to its request, with information regarding
offshore natural gas reserves by certain natural gas producers.2
Public interest groups sought access to the data under the FOIA and
the Commission decided to comply with this request. A battery of
objections from the major oil companies ensued,4" culminating in an
appeal of the Commission's order to the Fifth Circuit. The appeal
was grounded upon both the APA and an implied right of action
under the FOIA. The reviewing court rejected the notion that the
FOIA exemptions barred disclosure44 and refused to imply a right
of action on that basis. Instead, the panel found that the FPC had
abused its discretion and remanded the case to the Commission. 5
In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that the Commis-
sion's decision to release the exempted information was a departure
from prior agency policy and thus subject to a more exacting APA
review than ordinary FPC decisions. In exercising this stricter
scrutiny, the panel took note of the FPC's declaration that the pub-
lic interest in disclosure outweighed the potential harm to the sup-
pliers, but found that this cursory statement alone was an insuffi-
11 120 CONG. REc. 17,016 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
" 534 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1976).
" The Federal Power Commission (FPC) planned to devise a rate structure which would
provide for a more efficient development of the nation's natural gas supply. Discrepancies in
the figures then available to the government caused the FPC to require new, more detailed
information. Id. at 628-29.
11 Among those companies protesting the order were Mobil, Chevron, Exxon, Atlantic
Richfield, Texaco, Pennzoil, Union Oil, and Pacific Gas and Electric. See id. at 628. The
Commission conceded that the information was exempt under both the trade secret and
geological data exemptions. See id. at 630 n.2.
" The court stated that such an interpretation "would be at war with the basic principles
embodied in the Freedom of Information Act." Id. at 630. See note 10.supra.
534 F.2d at 632.
' See id. at 630. If other courts adopt this approach, it seems likely that, in the majority
of reverse-FOIA suits brought under the APA, agency action will be subject to this stricter
scrutiny since administative decisions to release exempted information often involve depar-
tures from the prior agency norms of maximum secrecy. Id.
19771
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cient basis to support disclosure. 7 The Fifth Circuit directed that
three additional factors be considered by the FPC in exercising its
discretion. First, the Commission should consider whether the dis-
closure of this type of data would aid it in its functions, i.e., whether
the consumers requesting the information could properly utilize it
in their appearances before the Commission. Second, the harm
done to the public generally by release ought to be weighed; if the
information oil companies discover through exploration would no
longer be guaranteed exclusivity, exploration might be curtailed to
the detriment of the public at large. Finally, the FPC should seek
and consider alternatives to full disclosure which would simultane-
ously benefit the consumers and protect the suppliers. 8 Only after
these three factors have received careful consideration and disposi-
tion by the FPC will a final decision of that agency to release ex-
empted information pass judicial muster in the Fifth Circuit.
A comparison of Charles River and Pennzoil demonstrates a
trend towards establishing specific factors which must be rationally
considered by the agency before its decision will be found to consti-
tute a proper exercise of discretion." In fact, the Charles River re-
quirements of a balancing of public and private interests5' and a
search for an accomodation of these conflicting interests were found
inadequate in Pennzoil, and additional factors were deemed neces-
sary. '" Thus, it is submitted that any concern regarding the inade-
quacy of relief under the abuse of discretion standard is unwar-
ranted, and the use of legal ingenuity to discover implied rights of
action is unnecessary. The courts appear to be fashioning specific
criteria which have the effect of strengthening APA review in
reverse-FOIA suits.
' Id. at 632.
'K Id.
The panel stated: "The Commisson, however, in making an informed decision and
before taking action that has such clear and Congressionally recognized adverse consequences
must consider all relevant factors." Id. The legislative policies behind the FOIA exemptions
could thereby be evaluated in an APA action, alleviating the need for an implied cause of
action.
" One commentator on the subject of reverse-FOIA suits has noted the regrettable ab-
sence of statutory guidance for APA review in such actions. Comment, Reverse-Freedom of
Information Act Suits: Confidential Information in Search of Protection, 70 Nw. U.L. REV.
995, 1016-17 (1976). The Charles River decision and the Pennzoil decision may fill this void
and help adequately define the abuse of discretion standard.
11 See discussion in notes 39-40 and accompanying text supra.
,2 See notes 47-49 and accompanying text supra.
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IMPLIED CAUSES OF ACTION
In seeking to obtain broader judicial review of an agency's deci-
sion to disclose information, suppliers have resorted to claims of
implied causes of action under either FOIA exemptions or other
federal statutes. Where an implied cause of action is found to exist,
the courts will conduct a de novo review of the matter in question,
attempting to determine whether in fact the material is so confiden-
tial as to warrant its withholding in the public interest. 3 This re-
view, not subject to the strictures of APA procedures, 4 reaches be-
yond the administrative record, inviting the submission of other
relevant information to the court. The implied causes of action as-
serted in reverse-FOIA suits will be analyzed within the framework
of the factors the Supreme Court has deemed relevant to the recog-
nition of an implied right of suit.
Legislative Intent & Implied Actions: Cort v. Ash
Recently, the Supreme Court, in Cort v. Ash,5 delineated the
factors relevant in determining whether a private cause of action
will be found to exist under a federal criminal statute not expressly
providing for one. 6 In Cort, a corporate stockholder sought to enjoin
the board of directors of Bethlehem Steel Corporation from making
illegal political campaign contributions. The stockholder based his
suit upon an implied right of action under a federal criminal statute
prohibiting corporations from making contributions to presidential
campaigns but affording no express private remedy for the corporate
shareholder. 57
After reviewing prior case law, the Supreme Court identified
four criteria which it deemed relevant to "whether a private remedy
1Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190, 1215 (4th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 97 S. Ct. 2199 (1977) (citing Note, Protection from Government Disclosure-The
Reverse-FOIA Suit, 1976 DUKE L.J. 330, 334 n.18).
1, Note, Protection from Government Disclosure-The Reverse-FOIA Suit, 1976 DUKE
L.J. 330, 334 n.18.
m 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
1 For a detailed pre-Cort discussion of implied causes of action, see Note, The Phenome-
non of Implied Private Actions Under Federal Statutes: Judicial Insight, Legislative Over-
sight or Legislation by the Judiciary?, 43 FORDHAM L. REv. 441 (1974). The author criticized
the Third Circuit's Cort decision in terms similar to those used by the Supreme Court a year
later. Id. at 456-57.
11 422 U.S. at 71. The criminal statute relied upon is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 610 (Supp.
V 1975). At the time of the Cort litigation, there was no statute providing a private remedy
for the corporate shareholder. There is now such a cause of action available under 2 U.S.C. §
437g (Supp. V 1975).
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is implicit in a statute not expressly providing one."'58 First, a court
should consider whether the plaintiff is "one of the class for whose
especial benefit the statute was enacted."59 Second, there should be
an assessment of the applicable legislative intent." Third, it should
be determined whether the implied cause of action is "consistent
with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme."', Finally,
the cause of action should not be one traditionally relegated to state
law.12 In Cort, protection of corporate shareholders was deemed a
subsidiary legislative purpose at best, and the implied cause of ac-
tion was denied. 3 Thus, the Court determined that legislative intent
is the overriding factor on the issue of whether an implied cause of
action exists under a particular statute. 4
Implied Cause of Action Under the "Trade Secret" Exemption:
Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Schlesinger
Exempted from the general rule of mandatory disclosure under
the FOIA are trade secrets and commercial or financial information
which are privileged or confidential. 5 By far, the most controversial
claim of a right of action in reverse-FOIA suits to date is that of an
implied action in favor of a supplier based upon this exemption.
This theory, often advanced by corporate suppliers of information,"
422 U.S. at 78.
Id. (quoting Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916)).
422 U.S. at 78 (citing National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Assoc. of R.R. Passen-
gers, 414 U.S. 453, 458, 460 (1974)).
" 422 U.S. at 78 (citing Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412,
423 (1975)). An alternate third criterion is "whether the statutory remedies have been ade-
quately enforced." Note, The Phenomenon of Implied Private Actions Under Federal Stat-
utes: Judicial Insight, Legislative Oversight or Legislation by the Judiciary?, 43 FORDHAM L.
REV. 441, 441 (1974).
" 422 U.S. at 78 (citing Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 652 (1963)).
0 422 U.S. at 80. The Court traced the legislative history of the statute and found that
the main thrust of the original Act of January 26, 1907, 34 Stat. 864, was a desire to purge
federal elections of undue corporate influence; the protection of the shareholder was, at best,
a secondary concern. 422 U.S. at 80-82.
" For a subsequent judicial application of the standards established in Cort, see People's
Hous. Dev. Corp. v. City of Poughkeepsie, 425 F. Supp. 482, 488-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). The
implications of Cort are explored in Comment, Private Rights of Action Under Amtrak and
Ash: Some Implications for Implication, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1392 (1975).
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1970).
For a sampling of the number of corporate suppliers in a single case, see note 43 supra.
Other giants of industry involved in reverse-FOIA suits have been United States Steel Corp.,
Westinghouse Electric Corp., General Motors Corp., Chrysler Corp., and Hughes Aircraft Co.
See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
97 S. Ct. 2199 (1977); Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 412 F. Supp. 171 (D. Del. 1976); Hughes
Aircraft Co. v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 292 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
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has been litigated frequently and ultimately has been accepted by
the Fourth Circuit in Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Schlesinger.7
In Westinghouse, certain government contractors sought to prevent
disclosure of Affirmative Action Program and Equal Employment
Opportunity Reports which they had submitted to the government
in compliance with an Executive Order."8 The plaintiffs contended
that their position as suppliers gave rise to an implied cause of
action under the trade secret exemption to enjoin the release of
information. The district court reasoned that the exemption prohib-
ited disclosure and, accordingly, granted the relief sought.69
The Fourth Circuit, in deference to the plain language of the
statute, 0 ruled that the FOIA "does not apply" to exempted infor-
mation, and that the exemptions, therefore, cannot prohibit disclo-
sure.71 Rather, the court found that a decision to disclose is permissi-
bly within the discretion of the agency. The exercise of this discre-
tion, however, is subject to "any clear declarations of a legislative
policy against disclosure as reflected in an exemption of the Act
itself. 7 2 Thus, the court held, in effect, that while the exemptions
do not forbid disclosure, the policy behind an exemption might do
so. The panel found that Congress, in providing the nine exemptions
to the general rule of disclosure," had intended to balance the pub-
67 542 F.2d 1190 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2199 (1977). The suppliers also
asserted the other statute exemption as a basis for relief. 542 F.2d at 1199-1203. This theory
of action in reverse-FOIA suits is discussed in notes 131-47 and accompanying text infra.
" Affirmative Action Program and Equal Employment Opportunity reports are filed
pursuant to Executive Orders 11,246 and 11,375, 3 C.F.R. 169-77 (1977). The reports must
be submitted to insure compliance with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e (1970 & Supp. V 1975), which forbids discrimination in employment on government
contracts.
11 392 F. Supp. 1246, 1250-51 (E.D. Va. 1974), aff'd, 542 F.2d 1190 (4th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 97 S. Ct. 2199 (1977).
" The FOIA expressly states that the broad mandatory disclosure rule "does not apply"
to matters that are exempted. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970).
71 542 F.2d at 1197 (citing NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 145-48 (1975);
Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
72 542 F.2d at 1197. The panel noted that APA review is available if the decision to release
runs afoul of one of the congressional policies. Id. at 1198. Later, in the opinion, however,
the court rejected APA review as too limited. See id. at 1213, 1215.
11 Id. at 1210. It is manifest that the FOIA was intended to protect the individual's right
to privacy. The Senate Report stated that "it is necessary to protect certain equally important
rights of privacy with respect to certain information in Government files, such as medical and
personnel records." S. REP., supra note 2, at 3. This broad protection was appropriately
incorporated into the personnel records exemption. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1970). The
Westinghouse court seems to have applied the personnel records exemption's protection of
individual privacy to the trade secret exemption's limited protection of narrowly defined
corporate data. 542 F.2d at 1211. See S. REP., supra note 2, at 9. Supplementing this erroneous
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lic's need to know against the individual's right of privacy. The
court quoted the Senate hearings on the FOIA, wherein it was stated
that the trade secret exemption was designed to protect confidential
information "not only as a matter of fairness but as a matter of
right. "' In addition, the court reasoned that "when a statute,
whether phrased in the form of an exemption or not, grants a private
party protection from disclosure, it carries with it an implied right
in the private party to invoke the equity powers of a court to assure
him that protection. 71 5 Moreover, since the "envious competitor or
the curious busybody" seeking the information is granted de novo
review of a government denial, the court continued, the aggrieved
supplier should be accorded a similarly broad review.76 Finally, the
interpretation with an isolated quotation from a subcommittee hearing, see id. at 1211, and
dicta from other cases, see id., the Fourth Circuit compiled a deceptively strong rationale for
permitting the implied cause of action. See id. at 1210-11.
1, 542 F.2d at 1211 (emphasis added by the court) (quoting National Parks & Conserva-
tion Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 769 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (quoting Hearings on S. .1666 before
Subcomm. on Admin. Prec. & Proc. of Sen. Comm. on Judiciary, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 199
(1964))). This testimony, however, was offered not by a member of Congress, but by a spokes-
man of the Justice Department. Further, it was offered in hearings held in 1963, a full two
years before the final Senate Report on the FOIA. It is submitted that this single statement,
standing alone as it does and unsupported by subsequent legislative reports, is insufficient
evidence of legislative intent upon which to base an implied cause of action granting de novo
review. See 542 F.2d at 1211, 1213.
71 542 F.2d at 1211. The court took a broad view of its equity power under the FOIA,
relying upon the Supreme Court decision in Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co.,
415 U.S. 1 (1974). In Bannercraft, the plaintiff, in the process of renegotiating his contract
with the government, sought to enjoin further proceedings pending his receipt of information
requested under the FOIA. The Supreme Court refused to allow the assertion of jurisdiction
for such an injunctive suit, but declared, in dicta:
The broad language of FOIA, with its obvious emphasis on disclosure and with
its exemptions carefully delineated as exceptions; the truism that Congress knows
how to deprive a court of broad equitable power when it chooses so to do ... and
the fact that the Act, to a definite degree, makes the district courts the enforcement
arm of the statute .... persuade us that the ... principle of a statutorily prescribed
special and exclusive remedy is not applicable to FOIA cases .... [Tihere is little
to suggest, despite the Act's primary purpose, that Congress sought to limit the
inherent powers of an equity court.
Id. at 19-20 (dicta) (citations omitted). A subsequent interpretation of Bannercraft, however,
stated that the broad equity power discussed by the Supreme Court was intended only to
carry out the purposes of disclosure. Seafarers Int'l Union v. Baldovin, 508 F.2d 125, 128 (5th
Cir. 1975).
11 542 F.2d at 1213. The court reasoned that de novo review could be obtained by a more
circuitous route if the agency were to honor a claim of confidentiality and withhold the
information, prompting the requester to bring suit for its release. At this point, the suppliers
could enter the de novo hearing as intervening parties. Id. The court found that the agency's
"delinquency" in failing to assert the supplier's "right" to confidentiality short circuited this
process and was sufficient justification for recognizing an implied right of action whereby the
supplier might assert the "right" himself. Id. It is suggested, however, that where the decision
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Fourth Circuit noted that if the review was limited to -a check on
administrative arbitrariness, the result would be to make the execu-
tive's "ipse dixit final."77
It is submitted, however, that the analysis of the Westinghouse
court does not comport with the congressional intent behind the
FOIA as well as judicial interpretations of that intent. The overall
thrust of the FOIA is directed towards disclosure of information in
the hands of the government.78 The Senate Report declared that the
purpose of the Act was "to establish a general philosophy of full
agency disclosure unless information is exempted under clearly de-
lineated statutory language."79 Subsequent legislative reports have
explained that the exemptions are permissive, not mandatory, and
that agencies may make disclosures of exempted information if con-
sistent with the proper exercise of discretion." In particular, the
trade secret exemption was deemed "necessary to protect the confi-
dentiality of information which is obtained by the Government
through questionaires or other inquiries but would customarily not
be released to the public by the person from whom it was ob-
tained."8 ' The scope of this exemption was judicially interpreted in
to release may be characterized as a reasoned act of discretion, rather than as a failure to
perform a duty, this analysis will not stand.
A second means of acquiring a de nova hearing was recognized in Sears, Roebuck & Co.
v. GSA, 553 F.2d 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In Sears, prior to the Department of Labor's final
decision concerning whether to release information sought under the FOIA, the suppliers
brought an action for a declaratory judgment in an effort to establish the non-disclosable
nature of the documents. 553 F.2d at 1384-85. The court found that, since APA review only
applies to "final agency action," 5 U.S.C. § 703 (1970), the action was properly brought and
a de nova review of whether the FOIA exemptions mandate non-disclosure was therefore
accorded the plaintiff. 553 F.2d at 1384-85.
11 542 F.2d at 1215. The panel suggested that a de novo hearing is "substantially the
same" as the Charles River evidentiary hearing. Id. The hearing ordered in Charles River,
however, was designed only to obtain additional evidence from the agency in order to deter-
mine whether the plaintiff had a valid claim of administrative arbitrariness. See Charles
River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 940-41 & n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1975); note 36 supra.
11 The Act was intended to open up the complex administrative structure and procedure
to public scrutiny. S. REP., supra note 2, at 3.
11 Id. The Senate Report was available for consideration by both houses, while the House
Report was issued only after the FOIA had passed the Senate. The Senate Report, therefore,
has been considered "the surer indication of congressional intent .... Benson v. GSA, 289
F. Supp. 590, 595 (W.D. Wash. 1968), aff'd, 415 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1969). See also Davis, The
Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. Cm. L. REv. 761, 762-63 (1967); Note, The
Freedom of Information Act: Shredding the Paper Curtain, 47 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 694, 697
(1973).
See note 10 supra.
" S. REP., supra note 2, at 9. Based on the Senate's explanation of the materials covered
by the trade secret exemption, the subjects of the litigation in Westinghouse, Affirmative
Action Program and Equal Employment Opportunity Reports required as a condition of
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National Parks & Conservation Association v. Morton.8" The Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit ruled that information would be presumed
confidential if its release would tend either to "impair the Govern-
ment's ability to obtain necessary information in the future" or
"cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the person
from whom the information was obtained. '8 3 The National Parks
court further stated that the trade secret exemption was "intended
for the benefit of persons who supply information as well as the
agencies which gather it.""8
The Westinghouse panel relied upon this and other excerpts
from the National Parks opinion to support its conclusion that the
FOIA exemption confers upon the supplier an implied right of ac-
tion to enjoin disclosure.85 National Parks, however, was not a
reverse-FOIA suit. In that case, it was the government which sought
to utilize the trade secret exemption to deny access to certain re-
cords sought under the FOIA. 5 Thus, any statements by the
National Parks court which might be interpreted as supporting an
implied cause of action clearly were not essential to the holding of
the case." In fact, the appellate panel which decided National Parks
noted in a later decision that
National Parks never stated that an individual had a right under
the FOIA to block disclosure when the government wished to dis-
close the information that it was not required to disclose. It simply
stated a test to be used to determine whether the information is
confidential."8
government contracts, appear to be excluded altogether from the scope of the exemption. Id.
But see General Dynamics Corp. v. Dunlop, 427 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. Mo. 1976) (finding AAP
reports within trade secret exemption).
82 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
' Id. at 770. Prior to National Parks, information was considered confidential if it was
not ordinarily released by the supplier to the public. This was the subjective test of confiden-
tiality. See Barceloneta Shoe Corp. v. Compton, 271 F. Supp. 591 (D.P.R. 1967). National
Parks, however, established a two-pronged objective test. See 498 F.2d at 770. A detailed
analysis of this area of the law is undertaken in Note, Public Disclosure of Confidential
Business Information Under the Freedom of Information Act: Towards a More Objective
Standard, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 109 (1974).
84 498 F.2d at 770. See note 87 infra.
See notes 58-64 and accompanying text supra.
498 F.2d at 770.
8 See note 84 supra. The panel merely wished to demonstrate that an exemption "may
be applicable even though the Government itself has no interest in keeping the information
secret." Id. at 770. In so doing, it appears that the court never envisioned that any party other
than the government could invoke the exemption. See text accompanying note 88 infra.
" Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 941 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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It is also noteworthy that the strong language of the Senate
hearings, an integral part of both the Westinghouse rationale89 and
the National Parks case,"0 never appeared in the final Senate report
on the FOIA. Instead, the report's clarification of the trade secret
exemption was neutral, at best, with respect to the intended pri-
mary beneficiaries of the exemption.' Indeed, Senator. Kennedy, in
introducing the 1974 FOIA amendments, 2 told the Senate that
"Congress certainly did not intend the exemptions of the Freedom
of Information Act to be used to prohibit disclosure of information
to justify automatic withholding. 9 3 Although denying that the ex-
emptions forbade disclosure, the Westinghouse decision, in effect,
promotes the use of the trade secret exemption to prohibit disclo-
sure, contrary to congressional intent, by sanctioning the implica-
tion of a private action based upon it."
A commentator on implied causes of action has noted that
"[f]or a federal statute to create a class of plaintiffs who may be
potential beneficiaries under the statute it must directly by clear
inference grant to the prospective plaintiffs a federal right to be free
from conduct which violates the statute."95 In light of both this
comment and the fact that the Westinghouse panel conceded that
the FOIA "does not apply" to exempted information,9" release of
that information apparently cannot violate the FOIA and thereby
make the suppliers a class of beneficiaries under it. Rather, the
release of such information may violate the APA, if disclosed in
abuse of discretion,97 thus making the APA the proper route for
judicial review. Assuming arguendo that Congress did intend the
exemption to especially benefit the suppliers, the absence of an
" 542 F.2d at 1211, 1213.
498 F.2d at 767.
" See notes 74, 81 and accompanying text supra.
g Senator Kennedy was chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Administrative Prac-
tice and Procedure. In this capacity, he introduced S. 2543, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974) which,
as amended, became the 1974 FOTA amendments, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1897 (1974).
See 120 CONG. Rc. 17,016-17 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy concerning S. 2543).
" Id. at 17,016 (remarks of Sen. Kennedy concerning S. 2543, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974)).
" See Clement, The Rights of Submitters to Prevent Agency Disclosure of Confidential
Information: The Reverse Freedom of Information Act Lawsuit, 55 TEx. L. REV. 587, 630 n.200
(1977).
,1 Note, The Phenomenon of Implied Private Actions Under Federal Statutes: Judicial
Insight, Legislative Oversight or Legislation by the Judiciary?, 43 FORDHAm L. REV. 441, 446-
47 (1974).
1 542 F.2d at 1197 (quoting NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 147-48 (1975);
Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 942 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
,1 See notes 27-29 and accompanying text supra.
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explicit or implicit remedy in the language of FOIA itself perhaps
indicates that Congress considered the APA an adequate basis of
review."
In viewing the entire legislative scheme of the APA, of which
the FOIA is the public information section,9" it appears highly un-
likely that any right of action with concomitant de novo review of
agency action was intended to be created. A compartmentalized
administrative scheme was devised to serve the needs of an increas-
ingly complex society.10 Each specialized economic, social, and
technological field of endeavor was provided with an expert forum
in which its interests could be understood clearly and its differences
heard and adjudicated, with due consideration given to the needs
of the public at large.0 1 Properly exercised, judicial review of these
decisions would respect the expertise of the agencies and only scruti-
nize the administrative record to ensure that all relevant evidence
was evaluated.' The de novo review accorded a party aggrieved by
a wrongful withholding of information sought under the FOIA is a
very limited exception to this general legislative policy, created to
advance the FOIA objective of full agency disclosure.0 3 The exemp-
tions to this rule of disclosure, therefore, were to be narrowly con-
strued. 4 Therefore, it seems that any implied right of action under
the FOIA exemptions giving rise to a de novo review runs counter
to three clearly defined congressional objectives: limited judicial
review of agency decisions, encouragement of disclosure under the
FOIA, and narrow construction of the exemptions. It is suggested
9" Given the broad range of decisions subject to APA review, the rule of statutory con-
struction expressio unius est exclusio alterius would seem to apply to the de novo review
accorded the aggrieved requester under the FOIA. Thus, since Congress specifically carved
out a narrow exception from APA review for the requester, the supplier's cause of action
should be governed the APA standard of review.
"1 The FOIA supplanted § 3 of the APA, 60 Stat. 238 (1946), which was the Public
Information Section of the APA. See generally Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary
Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 761 (1967).
11 The Supreme Court, in United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 203(1956), explained: "The growing complexity of our economy induced the Congress to place
regulation of businesses ... in specialized agencies with broad powers."
,0, See generally International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 366
U.S. 667, 674 (1961); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 800 (1945); W. GELL-
HORN, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 1-14 (1941).
"02 See Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 55,
80 (1965) (quoting Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 226 (1821)). See also note 29
supra.
13 See S. REP., supra note 2, at 8; HOUSE REP., supra note 2, at 2, 9, reprinted in U.S.
CODE CONG. at 2426.
I", See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
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that the congressional desire to protect genuinely confidential infor-
mation, the very policy upon which reverse-FOIA plaintiffs rely
when asserting an implied cause of action under the Act, can be
satisfied fully by the existing system of APA review without, as
feared by the Westinghouse court, 15 making the agency's ipse dixit
final. The criteria upon which the agency's decision to disclose are
evaluated" 6 sufficiently protect the supplier against unreasonable or
ill-considered action by the government. Under recent decisions,
agencies are required to consider various factors in determining
whether to release information, including the public and private
interests and the confidential nature of the data.' The complete-
ness of this evaluation and the rationality of the ulitimate decision
is then subject to court review. Upon review, the policies underlying
the FOIA as well as the interests of the supplier and the public are
taken into account by the court. "' It is submitted, therefore, that
the legislative history behind the FOIA is devoid of any intention
"I See 542 F.2d at 1215.
'1 See Pennzoil Co. v. FPC, 534 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1976); Charles River Park "A", Inc.
v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1975); notes 30-52 and accompanying text supra.
NI A determination of the confidential nature of the data is but one element of the overall
inquiry. Under this view, the mere fact that release of the information might cause the
supplier substantial competitive harm would not automatically require withholding. The
Pennzoil court noted that
FOIA is not irrelevant in determining whether information encompassed in its
exclusions should be disclosed. In reviewing the agency's exercise of discretion
concerning the release of such information, this court must be cognizant of the fact
that Congress in drafting a broad disclosure statute found sufficient justification
for withholding this type of information from public perusal.
534 F.2d at 630.
- In Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. GSA, 384 F. Supp. 996 (D.D.C. 1974), the district court
applied an APA standard of review and considered the policies behind the FOIA in determin-
ing whether agency discretion had been abused. Id. at 1001. Thus, if disclosure were to run
afoul of a policy underlying the trade secret exemption, it could be enjoined absent an
overriding public interest. The public interest will not invariably require disclosure. In Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co. v. Usery, 426 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1976), cert denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3748
(May 17, 1977), the National Organization of Women sought to obtain Affirmative Action
Program and Equal Employment Opportunity reports, as well as other information submitted
by various insurance companies to the Department of Labor. Id. at 154. The insurance
companies brought a reverse-FOIA suit to prevent the agency from complying with the
request. The court found that the public interest in disclosure did not outweigh the individual
interests at stake:
Balanced against the public interest is the insurance companies' interest in protect-
ing their competitive position and the employees' interest in their privacy. Disclo-
sure of the exempt information would seriously impair these interests. On the
balance, the slight harm to the public interest from non-disclosure of these docu-
ments is outweighed by the serious harm to the employees and the companies which
would result from the disclosure of these documents.
Id. at 171.
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to imply a cause of action based upon the trade secret exemption.
Instead, there appears to be a positive legislative scheme, of which
the FOIA is only a part, opposing such an action and limiting review
to the abuse of discretion standard. 109 Implication of a new and
conceivably unnecessary cause of action permitting broad review of
agency action thus would not only frustrate congressional purpose
but would give rise to additional court congestion " ' without afford-
ing a significantly greater degree of protection to reverse-FOIA
plaintiffs than that already provided through the existing method
and scope of review."' The courts should not embark upon such a
course absent the clear congressional authorization which seems
lacking in this instance.
Implied Causes of Action Based Upon Section 1905
Section 1905 of Title 18 provides that any employee of the
United States government who discloses "to any extent not author-
ized by law any information [involving] trade secrets" shall be
fined or imprisoned or both."2 Reverse-FOIA plaintiffs have endea-
vored to premise implied causes of action both upon section 1905,"1
and upon section 1905 in conjunction with the FOIA "other statute"
exemption."4
102 See S. REP. No. 854, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974); H.R. REP. No. 876, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 3 (1973), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6269; 120 CONG. REC. 17,016
(1974) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy).
I'* Almost all corporate giants submit data relating to their profits and expenditures to
the government. See Clement, The Rights of Submitters to Prevent Agency Disclosure of
Confidential Business Information: The Reverse Freedom of Information Act Lawsuit, 55
TEx. L. REv. 587, 588 (1977). These entities can afford the expense involved in challenging
the agencies in a lengthy and complex de novo review. Such a potential wave of protracted
litigation might reverse the post-1974 trend toward disclosure; it would almost certainly clog
the court dockets to such an extent as to impair the congressional purpose in devising the
administrative scheme, i.e., elimination of the bulk of essentially administrative controver-
sies from the court calendars. See W. GLLHoRN, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 13-14
(1941).
"' See notes 18-52 and accompanying text supra.
18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1970) provides in pertiment part:
Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United States or of any department
or agency thereof, publishes, divulges, discloses, or makes known in any manner or
to any extent not authorized by law any information coming to him in the course
of his employment or official duties . . . which information concerns or relates to
• . . trade secrets, . . . [or] confidential statistical data, . . . shall be fined not
more than $1000, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and shall be
removed from office or employment.
113 See Burroughs Corp. v. Schlesinger, 403 F. Supp. 633 (E.D. Va. 1975); Charles River
Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 360 F. Supp. 212 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd and remanded for further
proceedings, 519 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
1 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1970) (amended 1976). See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schles-
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The oft-litigated question of whether a private cause of action
can be implied under a criminal statute' was once again considered
by the Supreme Court in Cort v. Ash. " Therein, the Court declared
that the mere fact that a statute is criminal in nature will not
necessarily preclude an implied civil action based upon it.117 Rather,
an evaluation must be made of the legislative history of the statute
in question to determine whether the legislative purpose will be
furthered by private civil suits."' In Cort, the Court refused to imply
an action in favor of a corporate stockholder based upon a criminal
statute because protection of that party was found to be only a
subsidiary purpose of the law."9 The Supreme Court characterized
the law in question as "nothing more than a bare criminal statute,
with absolutely no indication that civil enforcement of any kind was
available to anyone."'20
A comparable situation is encountered with respect to section
1905. Enacted to synthesize a number of similar statutes then ex-
inger, 542 F.2d 1190 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 47 S. Ct. 2199 (1977).
,,' The leading case in favor of implying a civil action based upon a criminal statute is
Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967). In Wyandotte, the Court faced
the issue whether a cause of action for damages lay in favor of the government against a party
volunarily sinking a vessel in a navigable waterway. Such conduct was outlawed by section
15 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 409 (1970). If a ship were sunk, however,
the government would have to remove it at the taxpayer's expense, the only expressed remedy
being an in rem action against the ship. Id. at § 414. The Court found no indication that
Congress had intended this to be the exclusive remedy and implied an action for damages
against the violator, finding such an action to be in futherance of the congressional purpose.
389 U.S. at 206-07. See also J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
The contrary view-that the very nature of a criminal statute forecloses the possibility
of an implied action- was ably advanced by Judge Aldisert, dissenting from the Third
Circuit decision in Cort v. Ash, 496 F.2d 416 (3d Cir. 1974), rev'd, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). Judge
Aldisert noted that
[elvery criminal statute is designed to protect some individual, public, or social
interest ....
... To find an implied civil cause of action for the plaintiff in this case is to find
an implied civil right of action for every individual, social, or public interest which
might be invaded by violation of any criminal statute. To do this is to conclude
that Congress intended to enact a civil code companion to the criminal code.
496 F.2d at 428-29.
,,I 422 U.S. 66 (1975), discussed in notes 55-63 and accompanying text supra.
,, 422 U.S. at 79 (citing Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 201-02
(1967)).
"l 422 U.S. at 78.
", 422 U.S. at 81-82. See note 63 supra.
' 422 U.S. at 79-80. The Court distinguished cases in which implied civil actions were
found to exist, finding that the statutes in question in those cases expressly provided some
remedies and the only issue was the existence of additional ones. The pertinent statute in
Cort, however, provided no explicit remedies, and the legislative history hinted that no
implied actions were intended. Id. n.11.
19771
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tant,'2 ' 1905 is devoid of any definitive indication of congressional
intent.'" Its predecessors also suffer from the same infirmity. Given
the tenor of the Congress which enacted the present version of the
statute in 1948,123 however, it is suggested that the primary purpose
of the law was to prohibit quasi-treasonous disclosures of govern-
mental data; 24 protection of the supplier of information was perhaps
a secondary purpose. Thus, section 1905 appears to be squarely
within the ambit of the Cort denial of an implied right of action.
Nonetheless, two district courts have concluded that section
1905 provides reverse-FOIA plaintiffs with an implied private right
of action, although neither did so with extensive discussion. In the
lower court decision in Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 12. it
merely was noted that "[p]laintiffs have standing to invoke a crim-
inal statute to effectuate the Congressional purpose."' 26 The District
of Columbia Circuit, however, in remanding Charles River, stated
that "we do not think we should imply such a right [of action under
section 1905] unnecessarily.' ' 27  In Burroughs Corp. v.
Schlesinger, 121 the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
impliedly accepted section 1905 as a predicate for a reverse-FOLA
suit,' 21 but did not ultimately determine whether relief should be
granted under it."'
12, Act of Feb. 26, 1926, ch. 27, § 1115, 44 Stat. 117; Act of June 17, 1930, ch. 497, § 335,
46 Stat. 701; Act of Jan. 27, 1938, ch. 11, § 2, 52 Stat. 8.
in Expressions of legislative intent concerning either § 1905 or its predecessors seem not
to exist. The statute from which § 1905 developed was enacted as part of the Wilson Tariff
of 1894, ch. 349, § 34, 28 Stat. 557, which created penalties for the release of information
acquired by revenue collectors in the performance of their duties. Section 1905 extended
similar penal provisions to all government employees. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1970).
,z See E. GOLDMAN, THE CRUcIAL DECADE-AND AMTR, 99-102 (1960).
12 One commentator has viewed § 1905 as "a relic of an earlier age." Comment, Reverse-
Freedom of Information Act Suits: Confidential Information in Search of Protection, 70 Nw.
U.L. REv. 995, 1016 (1976).
"2 360 F. Supp. 212 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd and remanded for further proceedings, 519 F.2d
935 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
128 360 F. Supp. at 213 n.2 (citing Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191,
202 (1967)).
1" 519 F.2d at 941 n.6.
128 403 F. Supp. 633 (E.D. Va. 1975). Burroughs is illustrative of instances in which the
FOIA is used as a weapon to discover information pertaining to the business of a competitor.
Sperry Rand-Univac, a competitor of Burroughs, sought information submitted by Burroughs
in connection with an unsuccessful bid on a Navy project. From this data, Sperry Rand could
estimate future Burroughs bids on similar projects and calculate their own bids accordingly.
Id. at 634.
121 The court found federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970), since the
plaintiff sought to enjoin an alleged violation of § 1905 and claimed injury in excess of $10,000.
403 F. Supp. at 636.
'" Id. at 637 n.7. The court decided that the case was not ripe for dispositon and directed
REVERSE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
Section 1905 as Within the "Other Statute" Exemption
The broad disclosure mandate of the FOIA is not applicable to
matters "specially exempted from disclosure by statute."1,1 Section
1905 often has been asserted by reverse-FOIA plaintiffs to be within
the scope of this particular exemption.3 2 Under this view, any infor-
mation which cannot be disclosed under section 1905 falls within the
FOIA exemption and may be the subject of an implied cause of
action. Until recently, the courts uniformly had rejected the conten-
tion that section 1905 was embraced by the other statute exemption
in both direct133 and reverse-FOIA34 suits. The terms of section 1905
were considered too indistinct to be compatible with the wording of
the exemption. The leading case to the effect is M.A. Schapiro &
Co. v. SEC, 135 wherein the court stated: "Moreover, the provision for
documents specifically exempted from disclosure by statute ...
relates to those other laws that restrict public access to specific
government records. It does not, as defendants allege, relate to a
statute that generally prohibits all disclosures of confidential infor-
mation." 33
The Supreme Court raised doubts concerning the viability of
these decisions, however, in FAA Administrator v. Robertson. 7 In
Robertson, a public interest group requested certain documents
from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) under the FOIA.
Prompted by the airlines' objections, the FAA refused to honor the
disclosure request, pointing to section 1504 of Title 49, United
States Code, a statute giving the agency discretion in decisions to
release information, 38 as the other statute. The District of Columbia
a Charles River evidentiary hearing to determine the degree of confidentiality of the informa-
tion. Id. at 637.
"1' 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1970) (amended 1976).
132 See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190, 1203 (4th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2199 (1977); Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Kissinger, 385 F. Supp. 769,
772 (D.D.C. 1974).
lu See, e.g., Ditlow v. Volpe, 362 F. Supp. 1321, 1323-24 (D.D.C. 1973), rev'd on other
grounds, 494 F.2d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1974); M.A. Schapiro v. SEC, 339 F. Supp. 467, 469-70
(D.D.C. 1972); Frankel v. SEC, 336 F. Supp. 675, 678-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd on other
grounds, 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 889 (1972).
'13 See Neal-Cooper Grain Co. v. Kissinger, 385 F. Supp. 769 (D.D.C. 1974).
I3s 339 F. Supp. 467 (D.D.C. 1972). In Schapiro, the government unsuccessfully at-
tempted to withhold Securities and Exchange Commission staff studies, basing their refusal
to release the information upon § 1905 and the other statute exemption. Id.
'34 Id. at 470 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
'7 422 U.S. 255 (1975), rev'g 498 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
'3' 49 U.S.C. § 1504 (1970) provides in pertinent part:
Any person may make written objection to the public disclosure of information
contained in any application, report, or document .... Whenever such objection
1977]
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district and circuit courts found section 1504 not sufficiently specific
and rejected the FAA's claim. 3' The Supreme Court reversed, de-
ciding that this statute was one of many laws in existence at the
time of the passage of the FOIA which was not repealed by implica-
tion.4 "0 Disclosure was thus within the discretion of the Administra-
tor and not required under the FOIA. The Fourth Circuit, in
Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Schlesinger,4' applied the Robert-
son rationale to section 1905. The court determined that section
1905 fit "the description of an 'extant' statute as defined by the
Supreme Court in Robertson and it represented the type of 'general'
prohibition of disclosure discussed therein."'' The panel went on to
observe that Robertson probably overruled Schapiro. 3
Other courts have not agreed with the Westinghouse analysis.
The District of Columbia Circuit has found qualitative differences
between the statute considered in Robertson and section 1905:
Section [1504] specifically authorizes nondisclosure of informa-
tion filed with or obtained by a specific agency, the FAA, whereas
section 1905 is merely a general prohibition against unauthorized
disclosures of confidential commercial or financial information.
Any other interpretation would require departure from the estab-
lished policy of construing FOIA exemptions narrowly... and the
general rule that a criminal statute is to be narrowly construed.'
Furthermore, in 1976, the other statute exemption was amended:"
is made, the Board or Administrator shall order such information withheld from
public disclosure when, in their judgment, a disclosure of such information would
adversely affect the interests of such person and is not required in the interest of
the public.
1' 498 F.2d at 1031.
10 422 U.S. at 265-66. The Court found support for this proposition in the House Report
accompanying the FOIA, which stated: "There are nearly 100 statutes or parts of statutes
which restrict public access to specific Government records. These would not be modified by
the public records provisions of [the FOIA]." HousE RP., supra note 2, at 10, reprinted in
U.S. CODE CONG. at 2427.
141 542 F.2d 1190 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2199 (1977).
"2 542 F.2d at 1202. The panel found additional support for its holding that § 1905 is
encompassed within the other statute exemption in certain departmental regulations. Id. at
1202-03 & nn.33, 34.
"
31d. at 1202 n.30 (citing Note, Developments Under the Freedom of Information
Act-1975, 1976 DUKE L.J. 366, 395-98).
"I National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Kleppe, 547 F.2d 673, 687 n.50 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The court, however, expressly noted that its
consideration of this issue was "dictum." Id. at 686 n.46. A subsequent court declined to
overrule the National Parks decision, noting that the Supreme Court might grant review in
Westinghouse. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. GSA, 553 F.2d 1378, 1385 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
"I Government in the Sunshine Act of 1976, § 5(b), Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1247
(amending 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1970)).
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it now only applies to a statute requiring "that the matters be with-
held from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on
the issue" or "establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers
to particular types of matters to be withheld." ' The Conference
Report stated that "[t]he conferees intend this language to over-
rule the decision of the Supreme Court in [Robertson] .1117 Thus,
even assuming that the Fourth Circuit was correct in its interpreta-
tion of the law in effect at the time of its deliberations, it now seems
clear that section 1905 is not within the scope of the other statute
exemption.
CONCLUSION
Implied rights of action preventing disclosure of information do
not comport with the general philosophy behind the FOIA. Since
the release of exempted matter was left to agency discretion, APA
review is the proper remedy for the allegedly aggrieved information
supplier. Nonetheless, a judicial or legislative resolution of the un-
certainty existing with regard to implied actions would be most
welcome. Regrettably, the Supreme Court recently denied review in
the Westinghouse case,' thereby precluding, for the present, a defi-
nitive judicial determination. Congress, however, could act along
either of two paths: the implied right of action recognized under the
trade secret exception by the Fourth Circuit in Westinghouse could
be codified, or Westinghouse could be statutorily rejected. Given the
legislative trend since the enactment of the FOIA,4 9 the latter
course is the one more likely to be adopted. It would be advisable,
however, for Congress to include in any amendment a proviso that
requires agencies to give the supplier notice of an intent to release
exempted information before a final determination is made to do
SO."" Such notice would enable the supplier to fully present its case
848 Id.
8,7 HousE CONF. REP. No. 1441, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 25, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3743. The original House Report specifically cited § 1905 as one of the
statutes which might be affected by the Robertson holding and suggesting that the decision
should be overruled by statute. H.R. RsP. No. 880, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 23, reprinted in
[1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3687. For a discussion of the general effect of the
amendment of the other statute exemption, see Note, The Effect of the 1976 Amendment to
Exemption Three of the Freedom of Information Act, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 1029 (1976).
" 97 S. Ct. 2199 (1977).
84 Both the 1974 and 1976 FOIA amendments have sought to further promote disclosure.
See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (Supp. V 1975), as amended by Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1247 (1976).
"I To ensure that a supplier receives notice of a pending FOIA request, a statutory
amendment apparently is necessary. In Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Weinberger, 401 F.
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early enough in the agency's deliberations so as to obtain effective
consideration of its position. The interests of all parties involved
would thereby be fully and equitably adjudicated at the agency
level, as desired by Congress, while reserving limited judicial review
in cases of alleged administrative caprice.
Stephen J. Kaczynski
Supp. 444 (D.D.C. 1975), the court reasoned that since there is no right to enjoin disclosure
there can be no right to notice from the agency before a decision to disclose is made. Id. at
448.
